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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jamie Lee Nelson appeals from the Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Restitution, entered following the remand from her prior appeal in Docket No. 
40493, in which she challenged, in relevant part, the district court's failure to 
conduct a restitution hearing before entering reimbursement for prosecution 
costs under I.C. § 37-2732(k). Although the remand was solely for purposes of 
conducting a hearing, Nelson now challenges the constitutionality of I.C. § 37-
2732(k) as applied to her case. She also claims the new restitution award 
amounts to vindictive sentencing and is unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2012, a jury found Nelson guilty of possession of a controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. 1 (#40493 R., p.241.) At 
Nelson's sentencing hearing, the prosecutor requested "4,846 in restitution" -
"$100 for drug testing [and] $4,746 in prosecution costs." (Tr., p.11, Ls.17-23.) 
The prosecutor explained the prosecution costs were "for approximately 39 
hours of prosecution attorney time applied to the prosecutor in the case from the 
time the case hit district court," but did not "account for pre-district court 
arraignment costs," because those numbers were not "available at the time." 
(Tr., p.12, Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel responded: 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court entered an order augmenting the record in this case 
with the record from Nelson's appeal prior to remand, State v. Nelson, Docket 
No. 40493. (R., p.2.) 
1 
.. [A]s the court points out, there's not documentation as to 
the prosecutor's request for their portion. I can tell the court that 
Ms. Nelson has no objection to the $100 for the lab fee, but as to 
the rest, we'd ask the court to either [sic] flat deny it. It is within the 
court's discretion on whether that's granted. 
If the court's inclined to grant it, we'd ask the court to not 
enter an order today on the restitution but require the state to 
provide further documentation on that. Particularly, as the court's 
well aware, this case was tried twice because the state's witness 
caused a mistrial, and I think it would be unfair if the court was 
inclined to grant restitution for Ms. Nelson to be responsible for 
paying any costs from the first trial, so if the court's inclined to do 
that, we'd ask a specific split down on those areas. 
(Tr., p.20, Ls.3-19.) 
The district court "recognize[d] there were no other specific number[s] 
related to prosecution costs presented," but calculated $2,535.00 in prosecution 
costs based on "39 hours at $65 an hour," which it said was "the loaded benefit 
rate of an Ada County Prosecuting Attorney." (Tr., p.29, Ls.2-8.) The district 
court subsequently entered judgment, which included a provision that required 
Nelson to pay "Law Enforcement Investigation and Prosecution Costs, pursuant 
to Idaho Code §37-2732(k), in the amount of ... $2,535.00; jointly and severally 
with Adam Nelson," who was Nelson's co-defendant. (#40493 R., pp.289-291.) 
On appeal, Nelson challenged the award entered pursuant to I.C. § 37-
2732(k), claiming it was unsupported by any evidence, "let alone substantial 
evidence." (#40493 Appellant's Brief, p.11 (punctuation modified).) Nelson 
2 
asked that the state "be barred from seeking to establish restitution for 
prosecution costs." (Id. at p.13.) As an alternative argument, Nelson asserted 
that "ordering restitution for time spent on the first trial (which ended in a mistrial 
caused by a State's witness violating a pre-trial order) was inappropriate 
because it was not caused by [her] conduct." (Id.) Addressing Nelson's 
complaints regarding the award of prosecution costs, the Court of Appeals 
concluded remand was "appropriate under the circumstances of this case where 
the district court declined a request for an evidentiary hearing after Nelson 
objected to the state's inadmissible proffer." State v. Nelson, Docket No. 40493, 
2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 387 *5-6 (Idaho App. Feb. 21, 2014) ("Nelson"). 
On remand, the district court scheduled a restitution hearing at which the 
prosecutor submitted Exhibit 1 as evidence of the prosecution costs for Nelson's 
case. (Tr., p.45, Ls.1-12; R., p.25.) Pursuant to Nelson's request, the court 
permitted the parties to submit their restitution arguments in writing. (Tr., p.46, 
L.20 - p.45, L.7.) After the parties submitted their briefs, the court entered a 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Restitution (R., pp.35-41), an Amended 
Judgment of Conviction and Order of Retained Jurisdiction (R., pp.43-46), as 
well as a separate Order for Restitution and Judgment (R., pp.47-48). All three 
documents reflect a restitution award in the amount of $4,746.00 for prosecution 
costs ("jointly and severally with Adam Nelson"), and a $100.00 award for drug 




Nelson states the issues on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred in ordering Ms. Nelson to pay 
$4,746 in restitution for the prosecution costs in this case? 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Does Nelson's constitutional challenge fail because the restitution award 
authorized by I.C. § 37-2732(k) is not an unconstitutional penalty? 
2. Should this Court decline to consider Nelson's vindictive sentencing claim 
because the claim is not preserved and is not subject to review under the 
fundamental error doctrine? Alternatively, does Nelson's vindictive 
sentencing claim fails as a matter of fact and law? 
3. Has Nelson failed to show there was insufficient evidence to support the 




Nelson Has Failed To Show The Restitution Award Entered Pursuant To LC. § 
37-2732(k) Is An Unconstitutional Penalty 
A. Introduction 
Nelson contends the district court's restitution award under LC. § 37-
2732(k) is an unconstitutional penalty because, she argues, the award punished 
her for exercising her right to a jury trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-16.) Review of 
the relevant law shows Nelson's constitutional argument lacks merit 
R Standard Of Review 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute. kl The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality. kl 
5 
C. The District Court's Restitution Award, Authorized By I.C. § 37-2732(k), Is 
Not An Unconstitutional Punishment 
Nelson argues, as she did below for the first time following remand, 2 that 
the restitution award for prosecution costs entered pursuant to I. C. § 37-2732(k) 
is an unconstitutional punishment because it allegedly punished her for 
exercising her right to a jury trial. (R., p.31; Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) Nelson 
claims this is so because the award would have been less had she pied guilty. 
(R., pp.31-32; Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.) While it is true that the cost of 
prosecution is decreased when a defendant pleads guilty, this factual reality 
does not mean the award is unconstitutional punishment. Although Nelson cites 
general legal principles for the proposition that it is "patently unconstitutional" to 
penalize the exercise of a constitutional right, she cites no case that supports the 
conclusion she wants this Court to reach. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-15.) In fact, 
several courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have rejected 
arguments similar to the one Nelson advances. 
In United States v. Chavez, 627 F.2d 953, 953 (9th Cir. 1980), the 
government charged Chavez with willfully failing to file an income tax return. 
Chavez "filed a motion to dismiss the information on the grounds that the statute 
2 Nelson's constitutional claim was not raised before or as part of the initial 
appeal prior to remand. As such, the state questions whether her claim is barred 
by law of the case. See State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 72, 305 P.3d 513, 516 
(2013) ("[T]he law of the case doctrine 'prevents consideration on a subsequent 
appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier 
appeal.'"); Bouten Const. Co v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 762, 992 
P.2d 751, 757 (2000) (citation omitted) (if an issue was "not raised at the trial 
court level nor to the Court of Appeals on the first appeal, it will not be 
considered by this Court"). Nevertheless, the state will address the merits of 
Nelson's claim. 
6 
was unconstitutional" because the statute's "costs of prosecution provision was 
mandatory," and "chilled the exercise of his constitutional rights" - specifically, 
his rights to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, and to compulsory process. kl at 
954-955. The Ninth Circuit, citing Supreme Court precedent, noted that it is 
"clearly established that not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional 
right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid." 
Chavez at 956 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978)). The 
court rejected Chavez's constitutional complaints, reasoning: 
In the instant case we find that any pressures upon the 
defendant to waive his constitutional rights that may exist on 
account of the costs of prosecution provision are not such as to 
compel this court to find the Congressional scheme 
unconstitutional. A defendant, prosecuted for willful failure to file a 
tax return, is not subject to a substantial risk of greater punishment 
because of the existence of the costs of prosecution provision. 
The provision does serve legitimate governmental purposes. We 
cannot say with any confidence that the costs of prosecution 
provision of [the statute] does in fact penalize a defendant's 
exercise of his constitutional rights. [The statute] provides for a 
punishment of not more than $10,000.00, or more than one year 
imprisonment, or both. Any sentence that would be imposed upon 
conviction, within those bounds, would be within the ordinary 
discretion of the trial judge. The presence of the mandatory costs 
of prosecution provision does not, with any degree of certainty, 
substantially increase the threatened punishment. Any 
encouragement of the waiver of constitutional rights that this 
provision may induce is substantially different from the pressures 
that undeniably existed in [United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 
(1968)], and cannot be said to be an impermissible burden upon 
the exercise of constitutional rights. In light of the fact that the 
provision does serve legitimate government purposes, we cannot 
say that it needlessly encourages the waiver of constitutional rights. 
Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956-957. 
Nelson, like the defendant in Chavez, also relies on Jackson in support of 
her argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9, 13-15.) Jackson, however, does not 
7 
support Nelson's constitutional claim. At issue in Jackson was a federal statute 
that, in the Court's words, provided: "In an interstate kidnaping case where the 
victim has not been liberated unharmed, the defendant's assertion of the right to 
jury trial may cost him his life, for the federal statute authorizes the jury-and 
only the jury-to return a verdict of death." Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572. In other 
words, the death penalty was "applicable only to those defendants who assert 
the right to contest their guilt before a jury." !it at 581. The Supreme Court held 
this was unconstitutional because it impermissibly chilled the exercise of a 
constitutional right !it at 581-582. 
Unlike the selective death penalty provision at issue in Jackson, Idaho 
Code§ 37-2732(k) does not impermissibly chill a defendant's right to a jury trial. 
The statute provides, in relevant part: 
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under 
this chapter ... , the court may order restitution for costs incurred 
by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. Law 
enforcement agencies shall include, but not be limited to, the Idaho 
state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the office 
of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney 
offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for 
the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement 
officers and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, 
hearings and trials, and any other investigative or prosecution 
expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of 
employees. 
I.C. § 37-2732(k). 
The restitution award authorized by I.C. § 37-2732(k) is not premised 
upon whether the defendant exercises her right to a jury trial. That costs may be 
more, and therefore the restitution award greater, if the defendant proceeds to 
trial does not mean the statute impermissibly chills the exercise of the right to a 
8 
jury trial. To conclude otherwise would effectively negate the ability to offer 
reduced charges in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea - a practice that is 
clearly constitutionally sound. See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802 (1989) 
(citations omitted) ("we have upheld the prosecutorial practice of threatening a 
defendant with increased charges if he does not plead guilty, and following 
through on that threat if the defendant insists on his right to stand trial" and "we 
have recognized that the same mutual interests that support the practice of plea 
bargaining to avoid trial may also be pursued directly by providing for a more 
lenient sentence if the defendant pleads guilty"). 
Nelson's reliance on Jackson also ignores that subsequent Supreme 
Court cases have "not enthusiastically embraced the 'chill' rationale articulated in 
Jackson." Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956. In relation to Nelson's constitutional 
challenge, the most notable post-Jackson Supreme Court case is Fuller v. 
Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974). In Fuller, the Court considered "whether Oregon 
may constitutionally require a person convicted of a criminal offense to repay to 
the State the costs of providing him with effective representation of counsel, 
when he is indigent at the time of the criminal proceedings but subsequently 
acquires the means to bear the costs of is legal defense." 417 U.S. at 41. 
Among Jackson's constitutional arguments was his claim that the reimbursement 
provision of the challenged statute "might impel him to decline the services of an 
appointed attorney and thus 'chill' his constitutional right to counsel." ~ at 51. 
The Court rejected this argument because "[t]he fact that an indigent who 
accepts state-appointed legal representation knows that he might someday be 
9 
required to repay the costs of these services in no way effects his eligibility to 
obtain counsel." kl at 53. Similarly, the fact that a defendant who exercises her 
right to trial may have to pay greater restitution costs "in no way effects" her 
ability to exercise her constitutional rights. 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Fuller, and the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion in Chavez, several state courts have rejected claims that awards 
for prosecution costs are unconstitutional. See, ~. Ohree v. Commonwealth, 
494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("the imposition of the cost of providing 
a jury does not impose an excessive or unnecessary burden upon the exercise 
of the right of a jury trial under the United States Constitution"); State v. Albert, 
899 P.2d 103, 116 (Alaska 1995) (state criminal rule authorizing judgment for 
payment for services of representation "does not conflict with the right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution" or the 
state constitution); Commonwealth v. Hower, 406 A.2d 754, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1979) (although "the possibility that a convicted defendant may be required to 
pay the costs of prosecution may impose some burden on a particular 
defendant's choice of whether to go to trial or plead guilty and thereby avoid the 
costs," "not every burden imposed by the state on a defendant's right to trial is 
constitutionally prohibited"). 
Nelson has failed to meet her burden of establishing that I.C. § 37-2732(k) 
is an unconstitutional punishment. 
10 
11. 
This Court Should Decline To Consider Nelson's Vindictive Sentencing Claim 
Because It Is Not Preserved And Is Not Reviewable As Fundamental Error; 
Alternatively, Nelson's Vindictive Sentencing Claim Is Contrary To The Facts And 
The Law 
A Introduction 
Nelson argues, for the first time on appeal, that the restitution award 
entered on remand amounts to a vindictive sentence because it is more than the 
amount originally awarded. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-22.) The Court should 
decline to consider Nelson's argument because it is not preserved and is not 
reviewable for fundamental error. Even if considered, Nelson's vindictive 
sentencing argument fails factually and legally. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Appellate courts employ a bifurcated standard of reviewing due process 
claims on appeal, deferring to the trial court's factual findings but freely reviewing 
the application of the law to the facts found. State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 
788, 979 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 796, 932 
P.2d 907, 919 (Ct. App. 1997). "An allegation of vindictiveness presents a subtle 
and narrow question. To determine whether the sentence was vindictively 
11 
imposed, [the Court] look[s] to the totality of the circumstances and examines the 
words and actions of the judge as a whole." Stedtfeld v. State, 114 Idaho 273, 
276,755 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Ct. App. 1988). 
C. This Court Should Decline To Consider Nelson's Vindictive Sentencing 
Claim Because It Is Not Preserved And Because It Is Not Reviewable For 
Fundamental Error 
Nelson does not dispute that she did not raise a vindictive sentence 
objection to the district court, but claims she was not required to "because the 
district court's decision was the source of the error" and, according to Nelson, 
she "did not have a meaningful opportunity to challenge that decision below." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) In support of this assertion, Nelson relies on State v. 
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1998), and the 
exception cited therein that an issue will be considered if it was addressed by the 
trial court. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) This exception has no application to this 
case because the district court never decided whether the restitution order was 
vindictive. Moreover, Nelson's claim that she "did not have a meaningful 
opportunity to challenge that decision below" is belied by the record. 
At the restitution hearing on remand, the state submitted a request for 
$4,746.00 - the same amount it originally requested before Nelson appealed 
and the case was remanded. (Compare R., p.25 with Tr., p.11, Ls.22-23.) 
Nelson was given the opportunity to file a written objection to the requested 
award, which she did, and could have argued, at that time, that the court was 
precluded from ordering the state's requested restitution because such an award 
would, in her view, constitute vindictive sentencing. Nelson, however, made no 
12 
such argument. (See generally R., pp.30-33.) Nor did she file a motion after the 
court entered its amended judgment challenging the award on this basis; a 
motion she clearly could have filed. Nelson's claim that she did not have a 
"meaningful opportunity to challenge" the restitution ordered on remand is 
disingenuous. 
Nelson alternatively asserts that, "even if this Court decides the issue was 
not preserved, vindictive sentencing is reviewable as fundamental error." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) While Nelson is correct that a vindictive sentencing 
claim is reviewable as fundamental error, her claim does not qualify as such 
because a restitution award is not a sentence. 
In State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 
2010), the defendant claimed, for the first time on appeal, that the district court's 
restitution award, entered pursuant to I.C. 37-2732(k), "unconstitutionally 
punished him for exercising his statutory and due process right to challenge the 
state's restitution request," because the district court included the costs incurred 
at the restitution hearing as part of the award. The Court of Appeals rejected 
Mosqueda's argument that the claim could be raised for the first time on appeal, 
concluding that, "restitution, while attendant to a criminal conviction and most-
often adjudicated at the sentencing hearing, is not part of a defendant's 
'sentence.' Instead, a restitution proceeding is, in essence, a civil proceeding 
distinct from the criminal case." kt at 834, 252 P.3d at 567 (citations and 
footnote omitted). Because the fundamental error doctrine only "allows a 
criminal defendant the opportunity, in strictly limited circumstances, to raise an 
13 
issue challenging his conviction on direct appeal that was not formally 
preseNed," and because a restitution proceeding is civil in nature, the Court held 
"the fundamental error doctrine may not be invoked to raise a restitution issue for 
the first time on appeal because restitution proceedings are civil in nature." .kl 
The Court, therefore, "decline[d] to address" Mosqueda's vindictive sentencing 
claim. .kl The Court in this case should likewise decline to address Nelson's 
unpreseNed vindictive sentencing claim. 
D. Even If Considered, Nelson's Vindictive Sentencing Claim Fails Under 
The Facts And The Law 
Even if this Court considers Nelson's vindictive sentencing claim, it fails. 
Because Nelson has raised her vindictive sentencing claim for the first time on 
appeal, if the Court considers it, it must do so under the fundamental error 
standard of review. Under that standard, "an appellate court should reverse" 
only if Nelson "persuades the court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or 
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious 
without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." State v. 
Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 791, 275 P.3d 12, 17 (Ct. App. 2012). 
"[l)n North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled on other 
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), the Court held that a 
defendant, who had successfully attacked his or her conviction and gained a new 
trial, could not be punished with a longer sentence upon retrial for exercising his 
or her right to appeal or for otherwise collaterally attacking his or her first 
14 
conviction." Grist, 152 Idaho at 792, 275 P.3d at 18 (full citations for Pearce and 
Smith omitted). "In that context, the Court determined that, when a court 
imposes a more severe sentence upon remand, vindictiveness is presumed but 
may be overcome by objective information in the record justifying the increase." 
Grist, 152 Idaho at 792, 275 P.3 at 18 (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726). "The 
Court further determined that a court's reasons for imposing an increased 
sentence must be made part of the record and based upon identifiable conduct 
on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing 
proceeding." kl However, "[i]n a number of cases after Pearce, the Supreme 
Court has limited the effect of the Pearce presumption." State v. Robbins, 123 
Idaho 527, 531, 850 P.2d 176, 180 (1993) (citing cases). In one of those cases, 
Alabama v. Smith, "the Supreme Court reversed a state court's application of the 
Pearce presumption where the original sentence was based on a guilty plea and 
the greater sentence followed a full trial." Robbins, 123 Idaho at 531, 850 P.2d 
at 180 (citing Smith, 490 U.S. 794). In doing so, the "Supreme Court noted that 
a full trial would bring out more information about the defendant and the crime 
than a guilty plea and would give the sentencing judge a fuller appreciation of the 
nature and extent of the crimes." kl "The Supreme Court held that in order to 
apply the Pearce presumption there must be a 'reasonable likelihood' that the 
trial court's greater sentence was based on actual vindictiveness." kL. 
Nelson claims she is entitled to the Pearce presumption because "the 
same judge issued both restitution orders," the "court's order on restitution was 
expressly reversed and it was told to do the restitution proceedings over again," 
15 
and-the "court's comments on remand demonstrate that it was being asked to do 
over again what it thought it had done correctly." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) The 
court's "comments" Nelson relies on are: "Whenever I got the court of appeals' 
decision, I looked at it and, thought, good grief. What was it that I did?" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.19 (quoting Tr., p.40, Ls.12-14).) According to Nelson, 
"[t]hose comments . . . demonstrate the district court's stake in the prior 
decision." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Nelson's arguments are without merit. 
First, the district court's comment that it did not know what it did wrong, 
was followed by the statements: "And so I pulled the sentencing transcript, and 
I've provided a copy to each one of the parties. So we need a restitution 
hearing." (Tr., p.40, Ls.14-16.) The court's comments in no way demonstrate 
vindictiveness, but instead show the district court's efforts to ascertain what it did 
wrong at the prior hearing. Nelson's attempt to construe the district court's 
comments as vindictive is, at best, a stretch. 
Second, assuming the standards for vindictive sentencing even apply to a 
restitution proceeding, the Pearce presumption would not apply in this case for 
the same reasons it did not apply in Smith. This case was remanded for the 
purpose of conducting a restitution hearing at which the state could present 
evidence in support of its request. Nelson would apparently have the district 
court ignore the evidence provided after remand, and simply reinstate the prior 
restitution award, which was based on no evidence. Such action would be 
legally suspect. As in Smith, the restitution award changed because it was 
based on more information, which is what the Court of Appeals required when it 
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remanded the case. Nelson's claim that the restitution award entered on remand 
was the product of vindictiveness is unsupported by the facts or the law. 
Operating on the assumption that the Pearce presumption applies, Nelson 
acknowledges that the presumption can be overcome if there is new information 
not previously presented, but claims that did not occur in this case because, 
according to her, "the State presented the exact same information in support of 
its request." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) This argument is based on a 
misunderstanding of the purpose of the Court's remand. The Court remanded 
for a restitution hearing because the prior restitution award was "supported only 
by an oral, unsworn representation of the prosecutor as to the amount of costs." 
Nelson at 5. Thus, the Court remanded the case for a restitution hearing for the 
state to present evidence. kl While the amount the state requested on remand 
was the same, Nelson is incorrect that the state did not present evidence. As 
noted, the state submitted Exhibit 1 in support of its request. That Nelson 
believes this evidence was insufficient does not mean no new information was 
presented. 
Nelson further contends that "even if the State's unsworn written request 
were 'new' information, the United States Supreme Court still requires that the 
new information 'concern[ ] identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant 
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.'" (Appellant's 
Brief, p.20 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726) (emphasis added by Nelson).) 
Because Exhibit 1 '"provides no new information about Ms. Nelson's conduct 
occurring after the original restitution order that would justify the increased 
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restitution award," Nelson argues the Pearce presumption cannot be overcome. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.21 (emphasis in original).) This argument only supports the 
state's position that Pearce does not apply to this case. It defies logic to claim, 
as Nelson does, that the state should or could submit "new information about 
Ms. Nelson's conduct occurring after the original restitution order" in support of 
the restitution request for prosecution costs incurred prior to remand. 3 
Finally, Nelson contends that, "even if the presumption does not apply, the 
record contains sufficient evidence to actually show vindictiveness." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.21.) This argument is premised on the court's "good grief' comment and 
the allegedly "unexplained and drastic increase in the restitution calculus after 
remand." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) For the reasons already stated, Nelson's 
characterization of the court's "good grief' comment as vindictive lacks merit. 
Her claim that the "increase in the restitution calculus" is "unexplained" also fails. 
The district court's initial restitution award was based on its determination, 
without any evidence, that the hourly rate of prosecution was $65.00 per hour. 
(Tr., p.29, Ls.4-5.) On remand, the only evidence presented was that the rate is 
$140.00 per hour. (Exhibit 1.) The increase is explained by the evidence, not by 
· any alleged vindictiveness. Nelson's claim to the contrary is belied by the record. 
This Court should decline to consider Nelson's vindictive sentencing claim 
3 The only relevant "conduct" by Nelson after the initial restitution award would be 
her pursuit of a restitution hearing, and Nelson would undoubtedly complain if 
the prosecutor requested costs associated with that, although such costs are 
permissible under the statute. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 834, 252 P.3d at 567 ("a 
reasonable reading of the statute includes costs incurred for law enforcement 
employees' attendance at a restitution hearing"). 
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because it is unpreserved and not subject to review under the fundamental error 
doctrine. Even if considered, Nelson has failed to meet her burden of showing 
the district court's restitution award entered on remand is the result of 
vindictiveness. 
111. 
Nelson Has Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Showing Error In The District 
Court's Restitution Award 
A Introduction 
On remand, the district court ordered Nelson to pay restitution for 
prosecution costs in the amount of $4,746.00. (R., pp.44, 48.) Nelson contends 
there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's restitution award. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.22-33.) A review of the record and the applicable law 
supports the district court's award of restitution; Nelson has failed to meet her 
burden of showing otherwise. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 
417 (Ct. App. 2013). The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will 
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 
882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 
P.3d 398, 401 (2011 ). 
In considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court 
"conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine" whether the trial court (1) "correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion"; (2) "acted within the boundaries of 
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such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it"; and (3) "reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, , 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App. 
2014) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
C. Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Restitution Award 
"Restitution may be ordered by the district court under I.C. § 37-2732(k) 
once a defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a crime under Title 37, 
Chapter 27 of the Idaho Code."4 State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257-258, 281 
P.3d 90, 94-95 (2012). "Since I.C. § 37-2732(k) is short on specific guidance 
regarding the nature of a restitution award or the procedure to obtain such an 
award, we find guidance in the general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304." kl,; 
also Weaver, 158 Idaho at _, 345 P.3d at 229 (citing Gomez, supra and 
Mosqueda, supra).) Under that statute, a restitution award must be based "upon 
the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, 
or presentence investigator." Weaver, 158 Idaho at_, 345 P.3d at 229 (citing 
1.C. § 19-5304(6)).) A restitution award "will not be disturbed if supported by 
substantial evidence." kL. (citations omitted). "Substantial evidence is such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." 
kl (citing Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276). "The state's certified 
accounting of the time it spent prosecuting the case, even if only an estimate, 
4 Nelson does not dispute that she was convicted of a qualifying crime for 
purposes of restitution under I.C. § 37-2732(k). 
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constitutes substantial evidence to support" a restitution award for prosecution 
costs. Weaver, 158 Idaho at_, 345 P.3d at 229. 
In awarding $4,746.00 for prosecution costs in this case, the district court 
"considered State's Exhibit 1, the presentence investigation, and the arguments 
of counsel." (R., p.35.) The district court's factual findings include the following: 
State's Exhibit 1 is a Statement of Costs and Request for 
Restitution in a Drug Case, signed by James Vogt, a Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, the assigned handling attorney for the 
prosecution of Jamie and Adam Nelson. The exhibit states the 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office "keeps records regarding the 
attorney time spent prosecuting drug cases in anticipation of 
submitting a request for restitution ... " and that Mr. Vogt "reviewed 
the time log in this case, which documents the prosecutor time 
spent prosecuting the above referenced drug case." It then states 
a minimum of 33.9 attorney hours at an attorney rate of $140.00 
per hour, not including preparation and argument for sentencing 
hearing, was expended. It requests a total of $4,746.00 in 
restitution. The form is dated November 14, 2012 and signed by 
Mr. Vogt, a licensed attorney. 
(R., p.37.) 
The district court also took "judicial notice of the times in the court minutes 
of this case where a deputy prosecuting attorney was present" and found that, 
"[e]xcluding the dates and times for September 11, 12, and 13, 2012 ... which 
represent the mistrial and time spent rescheduling ... the actual time in court 
from the minutes spent prosecuting this case [w]as 20.4 hours," which "includ[ed] 
sentencing and the rider review hearing." (R., p.38.) The court further noted 
several pleadings that the "deputy prosecutor prepared, signed, and filed." (R., 
p.38.) The court then concluded: 
The State's Statement of Costs and Request for Restitution 
in a Drug Case is a signed accounting of the time spent by the Ada 
County Prosecutor's Office prosecuting this case of 33.9 hours, not 
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including sentencing. The signed statement states the attorney 
rate for the office is $140.00 per hour. The signed Motion for 
Restitution for Closing Argument states this is the amount charged 
by Ada County in other criminal prosecution contexts, namely 
cases related to the penitentiary, and in fact is the rate Ada County 
charges all of its outside clients. 
The Defendant has not presented any evidence to question 
the accuracy of the state's accounting or to undermine or contradict 
that accounting. 
Therefore, the Court finds the State has shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence and by substantial evidence that .. 
. the Ada County Prosecutor's Office incurred the expense of 
$4,746.00 in prosecuting these cases. 
In reviewing the time actually before the court for purposes 
of this hearing as noted in the court minutes, an attorney assigned 
to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office spent 20.4 hours actually in 
court. This accounting of time is only from the call of the case to 
the conclusion of the matter and does not include travel to or from 
the courtroom or time spent related to other cases heard on the 
same days. In review of the matters filed in this case, including a 
written objection to the motion to suppress, and time necessary to 
prepare for voir dire and a three-day jury trial (and excluding the 
time for the first trial which resulted in a mistrial), this Court finds 
that the additional 13.5 hours requested to prepare these filings, 
engage in discovery, prepare for the hearings, and prepare for trial, 
including scheduling and interviewing witnesses, is reasonable. 
The time included for the accounting can include preparation and 
travel for hearings, not just the actual time in appearing for hearing 
or trial. State v. Weaver, [supra]. The accounting is substantial 
evidence of the time the deputy prosecutor spent prosecuting this 
case and the hourly rate for such prosecution. 
(R., p.39.) 
On appeal, Nelson contends the evidence was insufficient to support the 
restitution award for a number of reasons. (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-33.) First, 
Nelson argues that the "law of the case" based on the Court of Appeals' opinion 
prior to remand established "that the prosecutor's unsworn representation of the 
amount of the costs was insufficient as a matter of law to be the sole basis for 
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the restitution award." (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-24.) Nelson then contends that 
the district court's "order was based only on the prosecutor's written 
representation of the loss, which was essentially the same as the representation 
he made at the initial sentencing hearing." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) "Thus," 
Nelson concludes, "the district court's finding ... was impermissible because it 
was directly contrary to the law of the case established during the first appeal." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.24.) Nelson's argument is belied by the record. 
On the initial appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that the "district court 
entered the restitution award without any evidence as to what the costs of 
prosecution were," and it erred in "declin[ing] a request for an evidentiary hearing 
after Nelson objected to the state's inadmissible proffer," which was an "oral, 
unsworn representation." Nelson at 5-6. While Nelson is correct that the Court 
of Appeals concluded the "oral, unsworn representation" was insufficient, the 
prosecutor's request on remand was not, as Nelson suggests, "essentially the 
same." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) The amount requested was the same, but on 
remand, the state submitted an exhibit reflecting the basis for the state's request 
(Exhibit 1 ), and Nelson never asserted to the district court that the exhibit was 
inadmissible, she only claimed it was insufficient (see Tr., pp.45-48; R., pp.31-
33). Further, the court's award was not "based only on the prosecutor's written 
representation of the loss," as Nelson claims. (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) That 
much is readily apparent from the excerpts of the district court's memorandum 
decision set forth above. 
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Nelson next argues that the district court's conclusion that "$140 per hour 
represented the prosecutor's actual rate of pay based on his actual regular 
salary ... is not supported by the evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) In support 
of this assertion, Nelson points to defense counsel's written objection that the 
rate "is improper" because it "appears unlikely to be an a accurate reflection of 
the handling attorney's pay." (Appellant's Brief, p.24 (quoting R., p.33).) 
Defense counsel's argument does not constitute evidence. While the district 
court could consider Nelson's assertion that she did not believe the hourly rate 
cited by the prosecutor was proper, that assertion is not evidence and, the reality 
is, there was no evidence to contradict the state's claim. Nor did Nelson provide 
the district court with any of the information she relies on in this appeal in an 
effort to demonstrate the hourly rate is inaccurate. (Compare Appellant's Brief, 
p.25 with R., p.33.) This Court should, therefore, decline to consider it. 
In a related argument, Nelson complains that the district court 
"inappropriately flipped the burden of proof in regard to the rate of pay evidence." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Nelson is incorrect. The district court's observation that 
Nelson failed to "present[ ] any evidence that $140.00 does not represent the 
expenses actually incurred by the Ada County Prosecutor's Office paid as 
regular salaries of employees prosecuting this case," does not demonstrate 
improper burden shifting. The district court's statement on this point, when read 
in context, reveals that the court was responding to Nelson's arguments that the 
rate was "unreasonable," by noting that Nelson presented no evidence in support 
of the argument. While it is clearly the state's burden to present evidence in 
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support of its restitution request, it is equally clear that, when that evidence is 
unrebutted, the trial court can make a factual finding with respect to the only 
evidence presented. See Weaver, 158 Idaho at_, 345 P.3d at 230 ("Although 
Weaver questioned the accuracy of the state's accounting, he presented no 
evidence to undermine or contradict that accounting."). 
Nelson next argues that the restitution award "improperly includes time 
prosecuting" the felony injury to child charge on which Nelson was acquitted. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Nelson's contention that prosecution costs related to a 
jury trial involving multiple counts could be parsed so finely is unrealistic. See 
Weaver, 158 Idaho at_, 345 P.3d at 229-230 (a "certified accounting" of time 
spent prosecuting the case "even if only an estimate, constitutes substantial 
evidence sufficient" to support a restitution award; the applicable standard is 
preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Nelson also argues the restitution award cannot include the "not-
insignificant amount of time" spent "on the third day of the second trial" that was 
"dedicated to prosecuting the co-defendant" on a sentencing enhancement. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.30.) In actuality, this is not a claim that the evidence was 
insufficient, it is more properly stated as a claim that the court abused its 
discretion by improperly including restitution amounts for which Nelson should 
not be liable. To the extent the Court finds the district court erred in that regard, 
the remedy for that is to remand for recalculation of the restitution award to 
exclude that amount; the remedy is not to vacate the award based on insufficient 
evidence. 
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Finally, Nelson contends the district court erred by including time the 
district court was in recess during trial, including the time the jury was 
deliberating. (Appellant's Brief, pp.31-32.) According to Nelson, "there is no 
evidence suggesting the prosecutor was working on the case against Ms. Nelson 
during those recesses." (Appellant's Brief, p.32.) Nelson is, again, incorrect. 
There is evidence, in the form of Exhibit 1, that the prosecutor worked on her 
case for 33.9 hours. That the district court's award is based on its own 
breakdown of how the prosecutor's time was spent, which includes recesses, 
does not mean "there is no evidence suggesting the prosecutor was working" 
during those recesses. If Nelson wanted to rebut the evidence that 33.9 attorney 
hours were spent prosecuting her case, she could have done so in the district 
court. Absent any evidence to the contrary, the district court's determination that 
33.9 hours of prosecution time is compensable under I.C. § 37-2732(k) is 
supported by substantial evidence. Nelson has failed to show otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Restitution, the court's Amended 
Judgment of Conviction and Order of Retained Jurisdiction, and the court's Order 
for Restitution and Judgment. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 2015. 
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